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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
THE McGUIRE ACT AND THE MAIL ORDER VENDOR-COM-
MERCE CLAUSE LIMITATIONS ON ANTI-FAIR
TRADE STATE POLICIES
The persistent turmoil stirred up by legislatively recognized fair
trade contract systems' has once again returned to the litigious limelight.'
The current question concerning the extent of state legislative jurisdiction
specifically involves enforcement of the cause of action under state fair
trade laws against non-resident, non-signer, mail order houses. More
significant, however, is recognition of a federal policy on fair trade
which overshadows the specific controversy.'
Recently questioned is the extent to which Congress, in the exercise
of its plenary power over commerce between the states, can regnlate by
1. Resale price maintenance contracts have, over a long period of years, gone from
a status of absolute unconstitutionality to total validity in the eyes of the courts. I CALL-
MANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 359 (1945) ; Schachtman,
Resale Price Maintenance and the Fair Trade Laws, 11 U. OF PITT. L. REv. 562 (1950).
For the typical statute see IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 66-301 to 66-309 (Burns 1951). See
charts analyzing and comparing the fair trade laws of the states at 1 CCH TRADE REG.
REP. (10th Ed.) 3003-08 (1954). These statutes make lawful contracts of vendors with
buyers requiring that certain products, which bear the trademark, trade name, brand, or
name of the producer or distributor and which products are in free and open competi-
tion with other products of the same general class produced by others, be sold by the
buyer only at or above a minimum (stipulated) price. The statutes provide a cause of
action for anyone injured by the advertising, offering for sale, or selling of the products
below the minimum (stipulated) price, whether the party so selling the product has or
has not signed a contract with the producer or distributor.
2. In two recent cases preliminary injunctions against non-signing mail order ven-
dors have been denied, as well as motions to dismiss entered by the defendant mail order
firm. Revere Camera Co. v. Masters Mail Order Company of Washington, D. C., Inc.,
128 F. Supp. 457 (D.C. Md. 1955) ; General Electric Co. v. Masters Mail Order Com-
pany of Washington, D.C., Inc., 122 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). In another case
involving a non-signer, mail-order vendor, the plaintiff dismissed the action for an
injunction because the defendant had discontinued the injurious practice. In this case
the Justice Department filed an amicus curiae brief after the defendant had agreed to
a consent decree for a permanent injunction but prior to the time that the judge signed
the order. Sunbeam Corporation v. Missouri Petroleum Products Company, Civil No.
9778, E.D.Mo., 1954.
The General Electric case has been continued with prayer for permanent injunc-
tion argued on March 22, 1955. General Electric Company v. Masters Mail Order
Company of Washington, D.C., Inc., Civil No. 93-260, S.D.N.Y., pending. No decision
has as yet been reached in other cases. Sunbeam Corporation v. Masters Mail Order
Company of Washington, D. C., Inc., Civil No. 7419, D. Md., pending; Bissel v. Masters
Mail Order Company of Washington, D. C., Inc., as indicated in Note, 43 GEo. L.J. 258,
262 (1955). See Note, 16 U. OF PITT. L. REv. 50 (1954) for discussion of other recent
fair trade cases.
3. See consideration of the non-resident, non-signer, mail order vendor problem
in Cook, The Continuing Fair Trade Battle, 29 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 66, 82-83 (1954)
Notes, 43 GEO. L.J. 258 (1955) ; 22 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 25 (1955).
NOTES
excepting from the federal anti-trust legislation the application of state
fair trade laws to the mail order transaction.4 Without Congressional
authorization, the states may not regulate commerce solely to protect their
own internal economies.' It has been advanced that though Congress
has permitted states to make regulations affecting commerce through
liquor and insurance regulations,6 it does not follow that Congress has
power to permit this regulation for the protection of state economies.'
This contention would appear to be without basis, however, in light of
the decisions upholding the Hawes-Cooper and Amhurst-Sumners Acts,
pernitting states to prohibit the importation of certain prison-made
goods.'
4. "Old Dearborn [Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.,
299 U.S. 183 (1936)], of course, did not consider the challenges which are addressed
to the McGuire Act [66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1952)]. The argument is that
Article 1, Sec. 1, of the Constitution vests in Congress legislative power which can not
be delegated, and that Article 1, Sec. 8, grants to Congress powers over interstate
commerce which cannot be surrendered." Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant
Super Markets, 205 F.2d 788, 792 (5th Cir. 1953).
For other recent challenges to this exercise of the commerce power see Sunbeam
v. Wentling, 185 F.2d 903, 906 (1950); Brief Amicus Curiae for the United States,
pp. 31-34, Sunbeam Corporation v. Missouri Petroleum Products Company, Civil No.
9778, E.D. Mo., filed Oct. 12, 1954; Harper, Impact of Schwegmann Decision on State
Fair Trade Laws, ANTITRUST LAW SyzfposIum 1952, at 122, 130-31 (1952), Legislation,
27 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 379, 391, 396 (1953).
5. H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Baldwin v. G. A. F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
6. Liquor: Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., same v.. American Express
Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917) sustaining the Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 STAT. 699 (1913), 27
U.S.C. § 122 (1952), which permits the states to regulate the importation of alcoholic
beverages and creates a federal offense for the importation of such beverages in viola-
tion of state laws; in re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891) sustaining the Wilson Act, 26
STAT. 313 (1890), 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1952), which permits states to subject to its laws al-
coholic beverages entering the states even though the products are still in interstate com-
merce; accord, Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890). Insurance: Prudential Insur-
ance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) sustaining the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59
STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1952), which provided that state regulation or
taxation of interstate insurance companies is not to be considered restricted because of
congressional silence.
7. See Brief Amicus Curiae for the United States, supra note 4 at 34.
8. The Hawes-Cooper Act, 45 STAT. 1084 (1929), 49 U.S.C. § 60 (1952), was
upheld in Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936). The Ashurst-Sumners Act pro-
vided a federal offense for the shipment of prison-made goods into a state in violation
of that state's laws. 49 STAT. 494 (1935), repealed 62 STAT. 862 (1948), and now
covered by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1761, 1762 (1952). The Ashurst-Sumners Act was upheld in
Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937).
The state laws prohibiting prison-made goods appear to protect an economic in-
terest of the state in that they attempt to exclude the products of prison labor, pre-
ferring thereby the products of the free labor within the state. See Whitfield v. Ohio,
supra at 436.
Recent statements by the Court indicate that Congress has free discretion in allow-
ing states to make regulations affecting commerce. See United States v. Public Utilities
Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 304 (1952); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949);
Southern Pacific R.R. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945); Cloverleaf Co. v. Patter-
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In the McGuire Act of 1952, Congress attempted once again to estab-
lish effective fair trade for those states desiring it, while at the same time
preserving for other states freedom to choose free trade. In stipulating
that neither the making of fair trade contracts nor the enforcement of
rights of action under fair trade laws is an "unlawful burden or restraint
upon, or interference with, commerce," the legislative body did not,
however, specifically mention that the sales of non-signing, mail-order
vendors located in the non-fair trade jurisdictions could be enjoined.'
This attempted application of the McGuire Act is, therefore, widely ques-
tioned. Some see the statute as ambiguous,"0 and though an ambiguity
apparently may arise through construction of Section 2 of the Act as a
limitation on the two subsequent sections," it does not seem that enforce-
son, 315 U.S. 148, 155 (1942); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super
Markets, 205 F.2d 788, 793 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856, rehearing denied, 346
U.S. 905 (1953).
State courts have recently indicated that this principle applies to any redistribution
of the commerce power in the McGuire Act. See Masters Inc. v. General Electric Co.,
307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 802, appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 892 (1954); Goody Corp. v.
Raxor Corp., 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 802, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 863 (1954) ; S. Klein-
On-The-Square, Inc. v. Lionel Corp., 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 802, appeal dismnissed and
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 860, 863 (1954); Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Lionel Corp.,
15 N.J. 191, 104 A.2d 304, appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 859 (1954).
9. Section 4 of the McGuire Act provides that "neither the making of contracts
or agreements as described in paragraph (2) of this subsection, nor the exercise or
enforcement of any right or right of action as described in paragraph (3) of this
subsection shall constitute an unlawful burden or restraint upon, or interference with,
commerce." 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (4) (1952).
10. See Harper, supra note 4, at 129-31; Note, 43 GEo. L.J. 258, 263 (1955) ; Brief
Amicus Curiae for the United States, supra note 4, at 15-16. This brief for the United
States goes further than challenging the McGuire Act as ambiguous by maintaining
that the Act on its face precludes enforcement against the non-resident, non-signer,
mail order vendor.
11. Those advocating a restrictive interpretation of the McGuire Act place em-
phasis on what may appear to be words of limitation in Section 2. By that section
resale price maintenance contracts or agreements are excepted from the antitrust acts
and from the Federal Trade Commission Act "when contracts or agreements of that
description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions under any statute, law, or
public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia in which such resale is to be nade.... ." 66 STAT. 622, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)
(2) (1952). (Emphasis added.) See Note, 43 GEo. L.J. 258, 263 (1955) ; Brief Amicus
Curiae for the United States, supra note 4. From this language it is argued that since
there could not be a valid contract in the state where a resale is to be made, there can
be no enforcement of a right of action under the statute of a fair trade state in which
the mail order vendor may be advertising, because the sale takes place at the place of
business of the vendor and not within the fair trade state. If the reference to Section
3 is so limited, then Section 4 would only apply as to transactions between two fair
trade states. The validity of this contention seems to rest solely on an assumption that
the Section 2 reference to the place "in which such resale is made" as applied to the
mail order transaction across state lines contemplates only the sale in the limited sense.
See Brief for the Defendant, pp. 22-25, General Electric Company v. Masters Mail
Order Company of Washington, D. C., Inc. Civil No. 93-260, S.D.N.Y., pending. It
is submitted that, in light of the nature of the mail order transaction, of the location
of the effect of the mail order vendor's sale in a fair trade state, and of the traditional
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ment was intended to be limited to actions against violators located in fair
trade states."
The committee reports, like the Act itself, do not refer in specific
terms to the non-signer in a free trade state selling by mail into a fair
trade state. The terms of one report, however, are more explicit than
those of the Act and its preamble, and may possibly indicate legislative
intent to provide the states with the requisite legislative jurisdiction. 3
This resort to legislative history in aid of interpretation requires caution
and should probably be limited to the committee reports. If the statute's
history is pursued to the floor debates, however, language favoring a
concepts of the extent of legislative jurisdiction as determined by geographical boun-
daries, it must be concluded that the term "resale" in Section 2 refers to the place where
the purchaser is given an opportunity to buy rather than to the place of the sale as such.
See discussion at pp. 508-09 infra.
12. Section 3 is said to be limited by Section 2 in that Section 3 refers to the
exercise or enforcement of any right or right of action created by any
statute . . ." against a person ". . . willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for
sale, or selling any commodity at less than the price or prices prescribed in such con-
tracts or agreements whether the person so advertising, offering for sale, or selling is
or is not a party to such a contract or agreement! . . ." 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(a) (3) (1952). (Emphasis added.) It is true that there must exist a valid fair trade
contract. This contract must, also, exist in the state where the resale is to be made
according to Section 2. The resale contemplated by Section 2 is limited, it is submitted,
by the very grammatical construction of that section, to resales to be made by the
parties to the contracts. Therefore, even if the Section 2 places of "resale" contemplates
a sale in the limited sense, that does not apply to the sale of the non-signer in the sense
that the non-signer sale must occur within the fair trade jurisdiction. Furthermore,
Section 2 is essentially a reiteration of the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman
Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952), as limited to the validity of fair trade
contracts in interstate commerce by the decision in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Dis-
tillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). The substance of Section 3 is directed toward over-
coming the limitation of the first Schweginann case in providing that the enforcement
of rights of action under the fair trade laws against either signers or non-signers who
advertise, offer for sale, or sell below the price established in a valid contract is not
unlawful under the anti-trust acts. The Section 3 reference to Section 2, "such con-
tracts," then, merely says that there must be a valid contract in the fair trade state, and
that any person who advertises, offers for sale, or sells below a price or prices estab-
lished in that valid contract has committed a wrong actionable at the suit of any person
damaged thereby.
13. "The bill further provides that the application of these State laws to interstate
transactions shall not constitute a burden upon interstate commerce. The purpose of
this provision is to remove any obstacle, as far as Federal law is concerned, which
might stand in the way of a broader interpretation of State fair-trade laws so as to
make them applicable to retail transactions and retail advertising which cross State
lines. ' H.R. REP. No. 1437, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952). (Emphasis added.) It is
noteworthy that this report refers to retail transactions and advertising, which not only
affect interstate commerce but which actually cross state lines. Thus, the mail order
transaction was certainly meant to be covered, though again the report, as the Act, does
not specifically say that a free to fair trade state transaction is included.
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restricted interpretation of the McGuire Act may be found.'" Primary
reliance by those favoring such an interpretation is placed upon a statement
of Representative Patman in opposition to the subsequently rejected Cole
Amendment. 5 Though a portion of this particular statement supports
this position, a reading of the entire comment together with Representative
Patman's subsequent statements before the vote on the Cole Amendment,
seem to at least leave a question as to his real objection. Furthermore, the
concluding statement of the committee sponsoring the McGuire Act indi-
cating that the real objections to the Cole proposal went to its creation of
a federal cause of action should clearly be given greater weight. 6 It is
14. See Revere Camera Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co. of Washington, D. C., Inc.,
128 F. Supp. 457, 463 (D.Md. 1955) ; Brief Amicus Curiae for the United States, supra
note 4, at 17-31; Brief for the Defendant, pp. 29-40, General Electric Company v. Mas-
ters Mail Order Company of Washington, D.C., Inc., Civil No. 93-260, S.D.N.Y., pend-
ing; Reply Brief of Defendant, p. 13, Sunbeam Corporation v. Masters Mail Order
Company of Washington, D.C., Inc., Civil No. 7419, D.Md., pending; Reply Brief of
Defendant, pp. 21-25, Revere Camera Company v. Masters Mail Order Company of
Washington, D.C., Inc., Civil No. 7710, D5.Md., Feb. 23, 1955; Note, 43 GEo. L.J. 258,
264-72 (1955).
Study of the floor debates in two different cases has resulted in somewhat differing
views of the conclusions to be drawn. Compare General Electric Co. v. Masters Mail
Order Co. of Washington, D.C., Inc., 122 F. Supp. 797, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), with
Revere Camera Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co. of Washington, D.C., Inc., 128 F. Supp.
457, 463-64 (D.Md. 1955).
15. Id. at 463; Brief Amicus Curiae for the United States, supra note 4, at 25-28;
Brief for the Defendant, pp. 33-36, General Electric Company v. Masters Mail Order
Company of Washington, D.C., Inc., supra note 14; Note, 43 GEo. L.J. 258, 267 (1955).
The Cole Amendment offered a paragraph in substitution for the present Section 3 of
the McGuire Act, purporting to overcome the mail order problem by providing that it
would be an act of unfair competition to ". . . (1) sell or (2) have transported for
sale or resale or (3) deliver pursuant to a sale, or otherwise deliver, such commodity
in any such State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, where such a contract or
agreement is lawful, at less than the price or prices so established in such contract
or agreements." 98 CONG. REc. 4952 (1952).
Representative Patman indicated in objection that the Cole Amendment would pre-
vent merchants in a free trade state community such as Texarkana, Texas (his home
town) from advertising in the adjacent fair trade state community of Texarkana,
Arkansas, thereby affecting the Texas policy providing free trade for its retailers. 98
CONG. Rac. 4953 (1952).
It is submitted that the Cole Amendment, if it had been enacted, would have con-
tained the same infirmity urged against the present Section 3 of the McGuire Act. See
discussion in notes 11, 12 supra.
16. 98 CONG. REc. 4954 (1952). Though Representative Patman was an expert on
fair trade generally, he was not an expert on the McGuire and Keogh Bills being con-
sideied by the House, having made a pronounced error in a statement on the floor as
to the contents of the latter. He had not been a member of any of the committees con-
sidering these bills. His statements, therefore, as to the intended effect of the McGuire
Act and the Cole Amendment, should be considered with caution. See Plaintiff's
Memorandum, Appendix A, pp. X-XIV, General Electric Company v. Masters Mail
Order Company of Washington, D.C., Inc., Civil No. 93-260, S.D.N.Y., pending.
In the Senate, in answer to a question as to the applicability of the McGuire Bill
to the mail order houses, Senator Humphrey, the proponent of the Bill in the Senate,
replied that "the bill will have this effect. It will require that where there are trade
or branded names on which fair-trade prices have been established the mail order house
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advanced that, under a sound interpretation of the Act, legislative juris-
diction is granted over the activities of non-resident mail order vendors
occurring within a fair trade state. In this way effect is given to the
announced purpose of the Act to provide effective fair trade for those
jurisdictions which desire it while preserving a freedom of choice for
jurisdictions opposed.
Whether the courts in a fair trade state have personal jurisdiction
over a mail order vendor operating in another state is another basic ques-
tion. The tendency has been, under International Shoe, to accept a fewer
number of contacts with the state as sufficient for state jurisdictional pur-
poses." The formation of a single contract or the commission of a single
act has sufficed to give jurisdiction.' The mail order insurance cases
might indicate that jurisdiction could similarly be obtained over a mail
order vendor of consumer merchandise. 9 This extension of jurisdiction
by analogy to mail order sales of insurance should be qualified, however,
by the unusual state interests involved in insurance. Though in two recent
cases jurisdiction was found in the fair trade state courts over foreign,
non-signing, mail order vendors, a greater number of contacts with
will sell them at those prices in any State, just as the local retail man is required to do."
98 CONG. REc. 8887 (1952). It is suggested that this statement, if resort to legislative
history is in order, should carry persuasive weight. See Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, p. 25, Sunbeam Corporation v. Masters Mail Order Company of Washington,
D.C., Inc., Civil No. 7419, D.Md., pending.
17. See the discussion and citations in CREATHIAm, GOODRICH, GRISWOLD, AND
REESE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 128-29 (3d. ed. 1951) ; Note, 30 IND. L.J. 324, 328 (1955).
18. CHEATHAM, op. cit. supra note 17, at 144, 145. Note, 30 IND. L.. 324, 328 n.23
(1955) and cases cited.
19. The Supreme Court has at least partially opened the door for jurisdiction over
non-resident mail order vendors in Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643
(1950). There a state was allowed to maintain an action against a non-resident in-
surance company which contacted its existing policy holders in Virginia and from them
requested names of prospective purchasers of insurance. These prospects were then
contacted and insurance contracts were negotiated by mail. Compare Parmalee v. Iowa
State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.), cert. delied, 346 U.S. 877 (1953),
where the plaintiff, beneficiary, recovered on an insurance policy against the non-
resident defendant not authorized to do business in Florida. The insurance company
only solicited insurance contracts by mail, the contract in question having been made as
a result of the defendant's mail solicitations in Florida, with Parmalee v. Commercial
Travelers Mutual Accident Ass'n, 206 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1953), where no jurisdiction
was found over the insurance company. In this case, the decedent had made the in-
surance contract in Kentucky, transacted business with and paid premiums to the de-
fendant in New York, and then subsequently moved to Florida where he died. See 67
HARv. L. Ray. 527 (1954).
Though it has been suggested that Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, supra, in-
dicates there may be other types of mail order sales by foreign corporations which would
subject the vendor to service of process valid under the Due Process clause, it must
be recognized that in that case, the party in interest was the state in its effort to pro-
tect citizens under a regulatory insurance statute.
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the jurisdiction were there present than are found in the usual mail order
sale.2"
Should jurisdiction be found and an injunction issue,2 the enforce-
ment of that decree in the free trade state would present difficult problems.
Though enforcement of decrees ordering payment of money requires
the same full faith and credit afforded judgments,2" where the decree is
not for payment, the courts are divided, most states favoring recognition
and enforcement.2 If an opposing public policy exists in the jurisdiction
asked to recognize the decree, it is questionable whether recognition should
be compelled under the Full Faith and Credit clause. It seems that the
answer should be governed by a consideration of the results rather than
by resort to a priori reasoning based on the historical nature of equitable
decrees."
It would seem that a vendor located in a free trade state approach-
ing consumers within a fair trade state by mail is engaged in unfair com-
petition under the latter's fair trade act. The distribution of the mail
circulars to the consumers within the fair trade state certainly constitutes
"advertising" within that state. Commercial circles generally agree that an
advertisement in a handbill is not ordinarily intended as an offer which,
20. Jurisdiction was found in one case where the vendor's principal place of busi-
ness was in Washington, D.C., and the fair trade forum was New York. The defend-
ant vendor was an affiliate of a New York corporation with the stock of both cor-
porations owned by the same parties and with the same individuals serving as officers
of both corporations. The offices of both were in New York, and the mail order
circulars of the Washington, D.C., subsidiary were distributed over the counter of the
New York store. General Electric Co. v. Masters Mail Order Company of Washing-
ton, D.C., Inc., 122 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
In another case, jurisdiction of this same defendant was found in the fair trade
forum, Maryland, even though the defendant had no place of business except that
in the District of Columbia, since the defendant was incorporated under the laws of
that state. Revere Camera Co. v. Masters Mail Order Company of Washington, D.C.,
Inc., 128 F. Supp. 457 (D.Md. 1955).
21. Here it is assumed that the fair trade state court, having once found jurisdic-
tion of the mail order vendor, would grant an injunction. The anti-trust sfatutes of
a free trade forum, which might contain the public policy capable of barring an action
in the free trade state, might be construed by the fair trade forum as limited to a free
trade state interest in the preservation of free competition. See discussion at pp. 516-17
infra. The anti-trust statutes might also be construed to raise a procedural bar only
for the convenience of the free trade state courts. Either construction would permit
the fair trade forum to ignore the free trade state public policy and grant an injunction.
See JACKSON, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 29 (1945).
22. The public policy of the forum is not a valid reason for refusal to enforce
the judgment of a court in a foreign jurisdiction. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 620-21
(3d ed. 1949) ; Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in
the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 HARV. L. REV. 533, 546-47 (1926).
23. STUMBERO, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 124-25 (2d ed. 1951).
24. Traditionally, since an injunction is a decree of the court and since the parties
are responsible to that court which has no jurisdiction beyond the borders of the state
which created it, the question has been raised by some that a state should not be
required to enforce a foreign state equitable decree. Id. at 124, 130.
NOTES
upon acceptance, can be turned into a binding contract, and that distribu-
tion of the circulars does not technically constitute "offering for sale."25
The sale technically takes place, according to the general rule, where the
title to goods passes. In the absence of contrary intent, this is upon de-
livery to the carrier, even where the shipment is C.O.D.2" All sales
by the mail order vendor would thus seemingly occur at his place of
business in the non-fair trade state. Certain facts of a mail order trans-
action may indicate the intention that title should not pass before delivery.
If the seller has undertaken to get the goods to the buyer, for example, his
performance is not complete until this is done."r It might be contended
that the transaction is a "sale on approval" rather than a "sale or return,"
in which case property would not pass until receipt by the purchaser.2"
Although the language in enforcement clauses of the fair trade acts refers
to selling and offering for sale below established minimum prices as the
actionable conduct, it must be considered that it is not the sale or offer,
in the technical sense, which is the object of regulation. It is rather the
effect-the opportunity presented consumers to obtain fair traded products
below the established price-at which the statutes are directed.29
25. VOLD, SALES 19 (1931). If the statutory language anticipates a customary,
technical "offer," the offer would then consist of the consumers' orders addressed to
the vendor, acceptance taking place and the contract for sale being consummated within
the free trade state. See Note, 22 U. OF CHI. L. RFv. 525, 526-27 (1955). It is note-
worthy, however, that the statutory language, "offering for sale," probably could not
be applied to the communication from consumer to vendor because that communica-
tion constitutes offering to buy. If "offering for sale" is used in the Act in a tech-
nical sense, then the distribution of the mail order circulars in the fair trade state is
probably not covered by those words. The mail order vendor presumably does not
intend to be bound through an acceptance by the consumer of an offer made in the
circular. If, on the other hand, the words "offering for sale" are used in a broad
generic sense, nearly synonymous with "advertising," the distribution of the circulars
would be covered by both terms. Rather than to assume this apposition of terms, it
is better to conclude that the mail order circulars do not, absent contrary evidence of
intent in the nature of the circular and the transaction, constitute "offering for sale."
26. VOLD, SALES 209 (1931).
27. UNIFORM SALES AcT, § 19, Rule 5. Absent contrary intent, if the mail order
vendor prepays postage or transportation charges as part of the understanding of the
parties before the consumer places his order, it would appear that title passes in the
fair trade state. VOLD, SALES 210 (1931). See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pp. 23-30,
General Electric Company v. Masters Mail Order Company of Washington, D.C., Inc.,
Civil No. 93-260, S.D.N.Y., pending. Where a sales tax law exists in the free trade
forum, and the mail order vendor resident of that state does not collect a tax on sales
by mail to residents of fair trade states, the inference would appear to be that title
passes in the fair trade state. Id. at 27-28.
28. Id. at 26-27. In the absence of a contrary intent, in a "sale on approval" title
does not pass on delivery to the buyer, whereas in a "sale or return" title passes on
delivery. UNIFORM SALES AcT, § 19, Rule 3 (1) and (2) respectively.
29. See Note, 22 U. OF CHI. L. Rxv. 525, 527 (1955); Plaintiff's Memorandum,
supra note 27, at 30. There can, of course, be no fair trade contract system in the free
trade state, and consequently no established resale price under fair trade can exist. In
the fair trade state an established resale price would exist. Without the presence
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Other factors have demanded consideration where the action under
a fair trade statute is brought in a free trade forum. A party seeking
an injunction would, if there was diversity, probably resort to the federal
courts where opposition from differing policies of the forum might not
be as strong as in the state courts. The federal courts in such cases must
follow the law, including the conflicts rules of the state in which that
court is sitting." The general conflicts rule for torts is that the law
of the place where the act first takes injurious effect controls the result. 1
If Section 4 of the McGuire Act could be viewed as a federal choice of
law rule, it would be necessary to apply that section to the activities of a
non-signer, mail order vendor located in a free trade state but selling into
a fair trade state. This Section was, however, supposedly inserted to cor-
rect the decision in Sunbeam v. Wentling32 that enforcement of fair trade
contracts as to non-signers constituted a burden on commerce.3 Section
4 should thus not be construed as a controlling federal choice of law rule.
A difficult question to resolve concerns the public policy of the non-
fair trade forum. 4 Under the present approach such policy is permitted
to bar foreign actions only when it is specifically expressed in a statute.35
of an established resale price, probably little harm would result from price-cutting
activities of a retailer. Even more significantly, without an established resale price, far
less motivation would exist for use of fair traded products in price-leading advertise-
ment. Consequently, the place of the sale in itself is not significant but rather the
fact of whether or not there exists an established price at the place where the con-
sumer is given the opportunity to buy.
30. Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) ; accord,
Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940). See
22 U. OF Cm. L. REV. 525, 528 (1955).
31. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 182 (2d ed. 1951); Ross, Has the Conflict of
Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?, 15 MINN. L. REv. 161 (1931).
32. 185 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1950), vacated and remanded, 341 U.S. 944 (1951). The
Third Circuit decided this case before the Supreme Court decided that the Miller-
Tydings Act did not apply to non-signers in interstate commerce in the first Schweg-
manan case. This case was then remanded by the Supreme Court for decision in con-
formity with the Schwegmann case.
33. The Wentling case involved mail order sales from Pennsylvania, a fair trade
state, to other states. A sale by mail through interstate commerce to consumers in
other states, however, would work no harm on the fair trade structures in the state of
Pennsylvania, but only on fair trade structures in other states. See discussion in note
29 supra.
The Third Circuit made an erroneous choice of law in attempting to apply the
Pennsylvania fair trade law to this case. Had the correct choice of law been made,
the decision would have been the same, but without the necessity of using a burden
on commerce rationale.
34. See KUH-N, COMPARATIVE COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
306 (1937). A comprehensive collection of cases involving the forum public policy
has-been made. See Note, 33 CoLum. L. REV. 508 (1933).
35. Cf., Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); First National Bank v. United
Air Lines, 542 U.S. 396 (1952). See STUMkBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 67, 171 (2d ed.
1951); Note, 22 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 525, 533 (1955). Few cases are found involving
torts where the public policy of the form has been used as a bar to an action. STUM-
BERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 198 (2d ed. 1951).
NOTES
Of the states which currently have no fair trade laws, two have statutes
making contracts to maintain resale prices unlawful,36 and these statutes
could operate to close the courts of the forum to an action charging a
violation of foreign fair trade laws in order to save the forum courts from
the unconscionable burden of having to issue decrees pursuant to those
laws. The courts would not seem to be greatly inconvenienced, however,
by requests for enforcement of foreign fair trade laws, which are almost
completely uniform.37 The denial of relief in the free trade forum may
arise out of broader policy considerations than that of convenience of the
courts. The more serious objections to the action may be found where
the free trade forum state has an anti-trust statute, which, though by its
terms is limited to intrastate transactions,"8 does represent broad policies
of the free trade state opposing attempted maintenance of resale prices and
protecting domestic businesses."9
The existence of a statutory public policy in the forum directly op-
posed to the foreign law does not permit that court to refuse recognition
without further consideration.4" The constitutional requirement of full
faith and credit places a limit on the extent to which a state may use the
forum policy." The absence of Supreme Court precedent on the question
36. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 416.020 (Vernon 1952); TEx. STAT., REV. Civ. art. 7426 (2)
(1948).
37. See Note, 22 U. OF Ci. L. REv. 525, 527-30 (1955). See also 4 CALLMANN,
THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 93.2 (2d ed. 1950), discussing
application of the continental "place of acting" rule to the common law torts of dis-
paragement and unfair competition.
Though some of the state statutes speak of stipulated and others of minimum
prices, it has been held that since the legislature only made unlawful sales below, not
above the stipulated price, a minimum price was contemplated. Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss
Co., 200 La. 959, 9 So.2d 303 (1942). See I CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.) ff 3180
(1954).
38. It appears that the state anti-trust statutes might easily be construed by the
free trade forum to include a mail order sale to a foreign consumer since the place of
the technical sale most likely would be found within the forum. See discussion p. 509
supra.
The Texas anti-trust statute cannot, however, apply to interstate commerce. Alber-
type Co. v. Gust Feis Co., 102 Tex. 219, 114 S.W. 791 (1909). Nor can the Missouri
anti-trust statute. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 23 U.S.L. VEEK 4150 (U.S. Mar.
28, 1955) ; Hadley-Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 Fed. 242 (8th Cir.
1906). These states are the only free trade states with anti-trust laws.
39. See discussion in Note, 22 U. OF CH. L. REv. 525, 534 (1955).
40. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of California, 294 U.S.
532 (1935), where Mr. Justice Stone said that "a rigid and literal enforcement of the
full faith and credit clause, without regard to the statute of the forum, would lead to
the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state must be
enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own." Id. at 547.
41. "Unless by force of that clause [the Full Faith and Credit Clause] a greater
effect is thus to be given to a state statute abroad than the clause permits it to have at
home, it is unavoidable that this Court determine for itself the extent to which the
statute of one state may qualify or deny rights asserted under the statute of another."
Ibid.
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of full faith and credit for the fair trade statutes requires resort to other
court opinions to discover the factors generally considered in determining
whether recognition of a foreign state statute is required under the
Constitution.2 Although there seems to be no one standard of review
by which it can be determined what choice of law is required, some of
the recent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that the result should
turn on the weight given the various governmental interests of the juris-
dictions concerned. The validity of these state interests is undoubtedly
limited by the differing nature of problems involved and the very exist-
ence of state boundaries.4
A consideration of the legislative purpose behind the fair trade acts
may help to determine the particular governmental interests of the states,
even though it has often been suggested, that the hasty enactment of the
state fair trade laws and the Miller-Tydings Act resulted from a force-
ful, well-organized, and self-interested lobby, precluding the presence of
a sound, considered legislative purpose. 5 A search for governmental
For general discussions of the operation of the Full Faith and Credit clause, see
LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 17 (1947); Note, Develop-
ments-Conflict of Laws-935-36, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1119,
1140-42 (1940) ; Beale, Two Cases on Jurisdiction, 48 HARV. L. REv. 620 (1935) ; Dodd,
supra, note 22; Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, 12 MINN. L. REv. 439 (1928) ; Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of
Laws, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1210 (1946); Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required
for Public Acts, 24 ILL. L. REv. 383, 404-05 (1929).
42. ". . . I think it difficult to point to any field in which the Court has more
completely demonstrated or more candidly confessed the lack of guiding standards of
a legal character than in trying to determine what choice of law is required by the
Constitution." JACKSON, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 28 (1945).
43. Probably the best statement of what the Court attempts to do is that often-
quoted one of Mr. Justice Stone: "The necessity [for the Supreme Court to determine
for itself the extent to which the statute of one state may qualify or deny rights asserted
under the statute of another] is not any the less whether the statute and policy of the
forum is set up as a defense to a suit brought under the foreign statute or the foreign
statute is set up as a defense to a suit or proceedings under the local statute. In either
case, the conflict is the same. In each, rights claimed under one statute prevail only
by denying effect to the other. In both the conflict is to be resolved, not by giving
automatic effect to the full faith and credit clause, compelling the courts of each state
to subordinate its own statutes to those of the other, but by appraising the governmental
interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision according to the weight."
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of California, 294 U.S. 532, 547
(1935).
44. The Court, at least in its language, seems to follow the viewpoint that, absent
federal authorization, a state may not extend its regulatory arm beyond its territorial
limits. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914) ; Scott v. San-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 460 (1857). See Langmaid, supra note 41, at 386, 420;
Freund, supra note 41, at 1225.
45. Forty of the forty-five states having fair trade statutes enacted these laws
during the period extending from 1935 to 1937. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MIiSSION ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE XXVII (1945). See Rose, Resale Price
Maintenance, 3 VAND. L. REV. 24 (1949).
The fact that none of the fair trade acts have been repealed, and the enactment of
interests inevitably leads to contact with the highly controversial economic
and social arguments advanced by proponents and opponents of fair trade
legislation.4" Many contend that the purpose of fair trade legislation is
protection of the small retailer, shielding him from the effects of loss-
leader practices and insuring him a mark-up equalling that granted his
large competitors."7 Further, it is believed that the elimination of retail
level price competition on certain products may provide employment for
many who might be left without work should the absence of fair trade
cause failure of marginal small outlets.
A further argument is that the state's interest extends to manu-
facturers. Fair trade is said to promote mass distribution necessary to
dispose of the output from mass production.4" Mass production in turn,
the McGuire Act less than thirteen months after the decision in Schwegmann Bros. v.
Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), may indicate that the federal and state
statutes now represent well considered legislative purposes.
In two states, continuing battles between the courts and legislatures have been staged
on the economic policy of fair trade. See Cox v. General Electric Co., 85 S.E.2d 514
(Ga. 1955) ; Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc., 54 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1951);
Fink, Fair Trade and Resale Price Maintenance in Florida, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 553 (1951).
46. The economic and social arguments in support of and in refutation of fair
trade have been presented often. See SELIGMAN AND LOVE, PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE
MAINTENANCE 32 (1932); 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 2185-94 (1952); Fink,
supra note 45; Legis., 27 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 379 (1953). Much of the literature carries
an emotional tone. Compare the following quotes, "For this band of little men [the
National Association of Retail Druggists] the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sher-
man Act was the end of a thirty years war." Rose, supra note 45, at 24. "The stig-
matization of resale price maintenance as anti-competitive conduct violating the anti-
trust laws is the result of a sort of hypnosis induced by uncritical acceptance of such
frozen phrases as 'lessening competition' and 'co-operative efforts.'" 1 CALLMANN, THE
LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 413 (1945).
47. ". . . [T]he committee is ever mindful of the effects on our economic and
political institutions that would result from the wholesale destruction of small concerns."
Report of Committee oin Interstate and Foreign Commerce, No. £.437 to accompany H.R.
5767 [McGuire Bill], H.R. REP. No. 1437, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952). See Eli Lilly
& Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 109 F. Supp. 269, 271-72 (E.D. La.
1953) ; Fink, supra note 45, at 553; Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. OF Cm. L.
R.Ev. 175, 191-92 (1954) ; Fortune Magazine, The Fair Trade Controversy, in READINGS
ON MARKETING 281-83 (Westing 1953) ; Comment, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 777, 780 (1954);
Legis., 27 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 379, 381 (1953).
48. The legal argument of Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers
Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936), that the manufacturer has a property interest in the
trade-mark or trade name of a product which is not passed completely to a vendor
on sale has often been challenged. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant
Super Markets, 109 F. Supp. 269, 271-72 (E.D.La. 1953). See recent discussions in
Fulda, supra, note 47 at 193-94, 209; Comment, 1953 U. OF ILL. L. FORUm 671, 676-77
(1953); Note, 16 U. OF PITT. L. REv. 50, 59 (1954); 102 U. OF PA. L. REv. 409, 412
(1954). Though these words of the Supreme Court are not accurately descriptive of
the true manufacturer interest, the divided property interest concept does recognize that
the presence of a brand name often requires stable resale prices for effective distribu-
tion. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, supra; Hum-
phrey, The Case for Fair Trade, in READINGS IN MARKETING 284, 285 (Westing 1953).
NOTES 513.
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is needed to reduce marginal costs which may permit higher prime costs and
better products, and permit lower retail prices, both of which factors
would operate to increase total sales.49 The consumer is benefited indirect-
ly because his welfare is dependent on that of the manufacturer." The
statutes also reflect an interest in the consumer by protecting him from the
off-setting higher prices which are said to accompany loss-leader selling.5
There is still another possible unspoken legislative purpose behind
fair trade statutes. Manufacturing has for several decades experienced
a concentration of capital, which, more recently, has been followed by a
similar and somewhat counter-balancing trend in the distribution system. 2
49. That this benefit to the manufacturer may result from fair trade pricing
seems to follow from sales statistics recently released by one manufacturer using a fair
trade contract system to achieve resale price maintenance. During 1953 in non-fair
trade District of Columbia, the sales of Sunbeam Corporation products dropped 11%
from the previous year, while during the same period, Sunbeam experienced a nation-
wide increase of 15%. During 1953, twenty discount houses in the District of Columbia
took over 80% of Sunbeam's sales for the District, while during that same period 600
small distributors discontinued selling Sunbeam products. Time, Feb. 21, 1955, p. 72.
During 1954, the Sunbeam Corporation experienced a further decrease in its District
of Columbia sales of 5.1% below the 1953 figure, while the national total during 1954
increased 15.8% over 1953. During 1954, 80% of Sunbeam sales in the District were
still concentrated in twenty discount houses, with four of those twenty now doing 75%
of the total discount house business. Letter from General Counsel for Sunbeam Cor-
poration to the Indiana Law Journal, Mar. 18, 1955.
Letters from other manufacturers of small appliances distributed under brand
names, though not presenting statistical demonstration of the concentration and loss of
sales experienced by Sunbeam in Washington, D. C., expressed strong feelings that
effective fair trade laws are needed to protect mass distribution of their products.
50. SELIGIAN AND LOVE, PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE 94 (1932).
Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting in the Dr. Miles case said that "I cannot believe that in
the long run the public will profit by this court permitting knaves to cut reasonable
prices for some ulterior purposes of their own, and thus to impair, if not to destroy,
the production and sale of articles which it is assumed to be desirable that the public
should be able to get." Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 412
(1911). See note 49 supra.
51. Note 46 supra. See Adams, The Schwegna-nn Case: An Economic Comment,
15 U. OF DETROIT L.J. 13, 16 (1951). An accepted practice in the retail field is that of
raising prices on several products while sharply cutting prices on a few leading items
at the same time to attract customers.
52. "It is simply inaccurate to present the American corporate system of 1954 as
a system in which competition of great units (which does exist) produces the same
results as those which used to flow from competition among thousands of small pro-
ducers (which in great areas of American economics in the main does not exist)."
BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 11 (1954). In the United States,
135 of the largest corporations own 45% of industrial assets. These same corporations
own 25% of the world total of industrial assets. A little over 50% of U.S. industrial
assets are owned by 200 of the largest corporations. Id. at 25-27.
Marketing has also been revolutionized during the last forty years and has ex-
perienced a tendency to yield to combination. 1 CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COM1-
PETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 127 (1945); GALBRAITH, A-MERICAN CAPITALISMI, THE
THEORY OF COUNTERVAILING POWER 118-21 (1952). See What Retailers and Their
Trade Associations Can Do About Fair Trade and Discount Houses, address by Albert
A. Carretta, member of the Federal Trade Commission, before the American National
Retail Jewelers Association, Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., Aug. 11, 1954, p. 5.
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The automobile empires are exemplary of both industrial and marketing
concentrations of power."3  Much of the concentration in the field of
distribution has taken the form of vertical integration which, in itself,
has been saved from the wrath of Congress and the courts. 4 In addition
there have developed franchise structures, agency systems, retailer-owned
wholesale establishments, consignment-sale plans, manufacturer-employed
consumer sales forces, private-brand goods, and fair trade contract sys-
tems. These devices enable the interested parties-manufacturers, whole-
salers, and retailers-not only to gain power through the combination of
capital but also to achieve resale price maintenance."3 Should states not
recognize the desirability of fair trade contracts, it might well be advanced
53. The sphere of influence of large manufacturers is certainly not limited to the
dollar value of industrial assets they control. The automobile manufacturers, through
their extensive and thoroughly regulatory dealer franchise systems, not only determine
when, where, how, and by whom their products are to be marketed, but can, through
the threat of revocation of the franchise, control the reputation of a firm's or indi-
vidual's business ability in a community. The automobile industry, however, has
recognized that this extensive control may be oppressive, and one producer has estab-
lished an administrative board of appeal to review franchise revocations. One state, by
establishing an administrative board for the same purpose, indicates a possible trend
toward public expression of dissatisfaction of this power to deal with other men's
income expectations. BERLE, THE 20T3 CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 77-83 (1954).
See Boro-Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 695 (1942). A similar degree of control exists in the gasoline and oil product
distribution channels. BERLE, op. cit. supra at 27-28.
The influx of combination and aggregation of power through the concentration of
assets in chain stores and mail-order houses brought Congressional action in the Robin-
son-Patman Act. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 et seq. (1952). See Rose, supra,
note 45; Legis., 27 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 379, 383 (1953) ; Note, 22 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
592, n.4, 593 n. 9 (1954). The recent Federal Trade Commission rule 203-1 on quantity
discounts illustrates how abuses of vertical integration and private brand merchandising
by chain organizations can be limited. 16 C.F.R. § 310.1 (Cum. Supp. 1954), discussed
in Note, 22 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 592 (1954). Use of an entire store as a loss leader has
been held violative of the Robinson-Patman Act. United States v. N.Y. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. II. 1946), affd., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949),
discussed in Fulda, supra, note 47.
54. See I CALLMAN-, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 127
(1945) ; Bork, Vertical Integration and the Shernan Act: The Legal History of an
Economic Misconception, 22 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 157 (1954) ; 54 COLUmn. L. REv. 282,
285-86 (1954). A manufacturer who owns retail stores is not precluded by the anti-
trust and FTC laws from establishing and enforcing a fair trade contract system with
other retailers. In re Eastman Kodak, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th Ed.) ff 25,291
(1955) ; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Schwartz, 133 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
55. Committee hearings, committee reports, and floor debates on the McGuire Act
recognized that there were other methods of resale price maintenance. Minimium Resale
Prices, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, on H.R. 5767, H.R., 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 13-14 (1952); H.R. No. 1437,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1952); Sen. Humphrey at 98 CoNG. REc. 8887 (1952).
Other resale price maintenance methods have been mentioned and discussed in re-
lation to fair trade. SELIGMAN AND LOVE, PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE
280 (1932) ; Weston, Resale Price Maintenance and Market Integration: Fair Trade or
Foul Play, 22 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 658 (1954) ; Williams, Resale Price Maintenance and
Freedom of Choice, Brief in Support of H.R. 6925, at 31-35 (1952).
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that the responsive market place would adopt or devise one of these more
rigid and generally less desirable methods of providing resale price main-
tenance.56
These suggested social and economic purposes are probably too indefi-
nite to be considered by a court as the affected governmental interests,57
but the court must acknowledge the governmental interest in recognition
and protection of fair trade systems within a state. 8 An attempt, then, is
to be made to resolve the conflict in governmental interests by looking
solely to the results which would flow from recognition or refusal to
recognize the fair trade statutes. It has been indicated that the harm
from violation of the acts occurs within the fair trade state. The fact
that mail order vendors in the forum will be affected by recognition of the
foreign law may not in itself result in frustration of the forum's policy.
If the forum is interested in maintaining unrestrained competition between
its retailers, that competition is not directly reduced by the limitation of
the scope of activity of some retailers selling by mail in interstate com-
merce. The limitation could only arise as those selling in interstate com-
merce are required by the operation of the foreign fair trade laws to
distinguish between their domestic and foreign customers in stating prices,
the resulting higher costs of doing the mail order business possibly reduc-
ing the ability of those mail order houses to compete in the domestic, free
trade markets. Restraining the activities of the mail order vendor in fair
trade states should not, excluding other factors, cause higher prices in
the free trade forum. It could be argued, however, that the prices in the
56. It appears that certain types of goods are generally distributed through only
one or very similar types of vertical combinations. 1 CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR
CO.MPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 358 (1945). The experience of one manufacturer
seems to show that a selective franchise method of distribution is better adaptable to the
sale of major appliances than is a fair trade contract system. Not only were list prices
followed after the adoption of the franchise system, but the total sales of the manu-
facturer increased. Business Week, Fair Trade's Legacy, in READINGS IN MARKETING
291, 293 (Westing 1953). A product-type listing of those items which are and are
not commonly fair traded indicates that fair trade systems are being used less to main-
tain resale prices on major appliances, while those contract systems are in active use on
small appliances and other "shopping" goods. Seib, Fair Trade Faces Showdozwnz, Na-
tion's Business, March, 1955, p. 34. For general treatment of the products subject to
effective resale price maintenance through fair trade systems, see Meloan, THE FAIR
TRADE CONTROVERSY 21, 82-83, 126-127 (MBA dissertation, Washington University,
School of Business and Public Administration, 1950). The state court decisions outlaw-
ing non-signer clauses may well have been the factor causing some manufacturers re-
cently to adopt fair trade contracts at the wholesale level. Hardware and Housewares,
February, 1955, p. 1.
57. See Freund, supra note 41, at 1225.
58. See Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, Inc., 166 Misc. 342,
344-45, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 320, 324 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1938). The failure to recognize this state
interest in the statute without questioning the social and economic judgment of the
legislatures has probably contributed to some invalidation of state statutes.
NOTES
forum would be indirectly increased. If the recognition by the forum
court of the foreign fair trade law causes such a reduction in the sales
volume of the mail order firms so that they could no longer sell in the
free trade forum at the low prices formerly offered, the overall effect
might be to increase domestic prices. 9
On the other hand, the failure to recognize the foreign fair trade
statute would have extensive effects on enforcement of the acts in the
fair trade states.6" It has been long recognized by decisions that enforce-
ment of the fair trade prices must be uniform.6' Though the petitioner
will not necessarily be denied relief where the violator can show a failure
to enjoin each and every violation,62 he will be denied an injunction where
there is not evident a vigorous, continuous, and effective enforcement
program." The recent position of the courts has been to scrutinize closely
requests for injunctions or for contempt adjudications, only granting re-
lief in clear cases. In one case where inquiry into the motives of the
offending party was required to establish contempt, the petition for
59. Another material limitation on the enforcement of the foreign fair trade law
in the free trade forum might arise where the validity of the fair trade statute under
the constitution of that state has not been decided. Should that constitutional question
be raised in the free trade forum, it appears to be at least doubtful whether a deter-
mination of the constitutionality of a sister state statute under the sister state's con-
stitution would be required. Recently a federal court declined to decide on the con-
stitutionality of the Tennessee Fair Trade Law, remitting the parties to the state court
for decision of that issue. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Anderson, 127 F. Supp. 511 (E.D.
Tenn. 1954).
60. See Sunbeam Corp. v. MacMillan, 110 F. Supp. 836, 843 (D.Md. 1953); see
Notes, 43 GEO. L.J. 258, 261 (1955) ; 22 U. OF CE. L. REv. 525, 537 (1955).
61. The uniform enforcement requirement does not preclude establishment of dif-
ferent minimum prices for different competitive areas. -The established price need not
be uniform throughout a state, nor must the prices in different states be uniform.
General Electric Co. v. Halem., 1950 Trade Cas. ff 62,613 (Sup.Ct. N.Y. Co. 1950);
see Editorial Comment, 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed. ff 3190 (1954).
62. Sunbeam Corp. v. Masters, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); see Note, 22
U. OF CRI. L. REv. 525, 537 n.60 (1955).
63. An injunction will be denied where it appears that the party attempting to en-
force the contract has condoned earlier violations with no evidence of, efforts to estab-
lish a fair trade enforcement program; the courts may not be used to establish the
price. Victoria Silk Press, Inc. v. E. J. Korvette Co., Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1954
Trade Cas.) 1 67,948 (N.Y.Sup.Ct., N.Y.Co., Dec. 23, 1954); Automotive Electric
Service Corp. v. Times Square Stores Corp., 175 Misc. 865, 24 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup.Ct.
N.Y.Co., 1940); accord, Lionel Corp. v. R. H. Macy & Co., Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP.
(1955 Trade as.) 11 67,949 (N.Y.Sup.Ct., N.Y.Co., Jan. 4, 1955). Though the state
laws do not require a uniform price throughout a state, and do permit vendors or
authorized distributors to establish the prices, the producers or owners of the trade
marks or brand names, would themselves set the price in order to circumvent the pos-
sible problem that would arise if two different prices on the same product would be
established where competitive areas might overlap. See Parrott & Company v. Somer,
set House, Inc., discussed in I CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th Ed.) ff 3170 (Cal. Superior
Ct. for Los Angeles, 1937). For general discussion of enforcement problems, see Fulda,
supra, note 47, at 202-03.
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issue of the decree on the pleadings was denied.64 A temporary injunction
was also refused where there was a conflicting issue on the claim of
notice.65 A rather extreme case refused a contempt decree where the
injunction did not include the actual price below which the defendant
could not sell.66 These recent trends lead to a near certain conclusion that,
should the non-signing vendor in the free trade state be permitted to con-
tinue his mail order activities in the fair trade states, the vendors within
the fair trade states would be immune to injunction. 7 The result would
be the collapse of fair trade structures in all states invaded by the mail
order circulars.
If the anti-trust statute of the forum has as its purpose the prohibition
of resale price maintenance contracts, the interstate nature of the mail
order transaction would require a conclusion that the public policy of
the forum cannot stand as a bar to the recognition of the foreign fair
trade statute. Even if the announced purpose of the anti-trust statute of
the forum be more generally to preserve free competition in the forum,
since the conduct in question and the resulting harm occur within the fair
trade state and since the direct effect of the requested relief will be
limited to competition within that fair trade state, it at least appears that a
balancing of the interests should fall in favor of recognition of the
foreign fair trade statute.
If the purpose of the forum anti-trust statute is considered still
broader so as to include protection of the forum retailers, a close question
is presented. As the fair trade state interest in the welfare of its retailers
is affected by the interstate aspects of commerce, so is the free trade state
interest in the welfare of its retailers. Application of the fair trade state
law to the operations of the non-resident, non-signer, mail order vendor
protects the fair trade state retailers while it injures the free trade vendors;
refusal to so apply the fair trade law, of course, works the opposite result.
64. Sunbeam Corp. v. Masters, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
65. Revere Camera v. Members Purchasing Corporation, CCH TRADE REG. REP.
(1954 Trade Cas.) ff 67,947 (N.Y.Sup.Ct., N.Y.Co., Dec. 23, 1954). The New York
rule holds that the non-signer must have notice of the fair trade price at the time that
he purchases the merchandise. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Nelson, 1950 Trade
Cas. II 62,663 (N.Y.Sup.Ct., N.Y.Co., 1950). See 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th Ed.)
fl 3268 (1954).
66. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 122 F.
Supp. 281 (E.D.La. 1954). See 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th Ed.) ff 3380 (1954).
67. On request for a preliminary injunction, however, one court has held that a
manufacturer who sells to a retailer owning a subsidiary mail order house in another
jurisdcition which resells into the forum at less than the fair trade price has not
abandoned his fair trade enforcement system without proof that such sales to a mail
order house will so weaken his enforcement policy as to evince willingness to abandon
the fair trade system. The question of abandonment was said to require a full trial
for proper determination. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Siegel, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 2496 (Sup.
Ct., N.Y. Co., Mar. 25, 1955).
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The balance of interests, therefore, might be determined by the number
and extent of the interests adversely affected in the respective jurisdictions
either by recognition or non-recognition of the foreign state fair trade
law. The absence of more compelling reason, however, may well lead to
the conclusion that the forum would not be required by the Full Faith
and Credit clause to subjugate its policy to that of the fair trade state.
It is submitted, however, that this recognition of a foreign fair trade
statute by a free trade forum as applied to the mail order vendor in the
free trade state does not merely present a conflict of laws problem.
Limitations on the policy of the forum may be found in the Commerce
clause of the Constitution as well as in the Full Faith and Credit clause.
The McGuire Act, though it may so appear, is actually not analogous to
the McCarran, Hawes-Cooper, Ashurst-Sumners, Webb-Kenyon, and
Wilson Acts.6" Those statutes affirmatively declared a congressional
intent to permit states to make regulations affecting the flow of commerce
in the direct, prior regulation by Congress. The McGuire Act, on the
contrary, does not withdraw the congressional exercise of the commerce
power.6" Congress has already affirmatively preempted this field by
enacting anti-trust legislation prohibiting price-fixing arrangements.7"
The McGuire Act is merely a modification of this federal anti-trust plan
and, as such, the statute represents a federal policy favorable to fair trade
pricing structures. The non-fair trade state anti-trust laws cannot be
applied to mail order transactions, either as a bar to the foreign action,
or as affirmative regulation of the interstate activities of a resident ven-
dor.7" Though a free trade state could regulate where the policies of the
federal and state regulations are in harmony, where there is a policy
conflict either on the face of the statutes or in their administration federal
supremacy demands that the state policy give way.12
68. See note 8 supra.
69. But see Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling, 185 F.2d 903, 906-07 (3d Cir. 1950); Brief
for the Defendant, p. 30, General Electric Company v. Masters Mail Order Company of
Washington, D.C., Inc., Civil No. 93-260, S.D.N.Y., pending.
70. See cases collected in Notes, 63 YALE L.J. 538 n.1 (1954); 63 YALE L.J. 399
n.4 (1954). Though Congress may well have said that it intended to withdraw the
exercise of the commerce power as to fair trade laws, what the Congress actually did
with the words employed, it is submitted, should be controlling. For discussion of the
controlling effect of words, see Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3
VAND. L. REV. 407 (1950).
71. See note 33 supra.
72. "'Where the statutes are in patent conflict, i.e., where compliance with one
necessarily constitutes violation of the other, the answer is provided in the supremacy
clause of Art. VI." SHOLLEY, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 946 (1951). Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) ; Interstate Natural Gas. Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682 (1947); cf. Schwabacker v. United States, 334 U.S. 182
(1948); Cloverleaf Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942). The absence of a policy
conflict between the state and federal statutes permits the state statute to stand. Cali-
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The limits of interstate commerce have been expanded in order to
give proper effect to congressional intent and to secure national uni-
formity. 3 As the concern of distributors of products for state borders
has decreased, so the federal anti-trust legislation has fought to keep apace
through expanded commerce concepts, carrying along the fair trade ex-
ceptions.7 ' Not only would the state fair trade laws become empty
verbalisms through either restrictive interpretation of the McGuire Act or
the failure to give full faith and credit in the free trade forum to the
foreign fair trade statutes, but the recent McGuire Act would also become
meaningless. It would appear almost ridiculous to take non-signer en-
forcement of resale price maintenance laws out of the purview of anti-trust
legislation, and yet in the same breath to declare, in effect, that enforce-
ment against the non-signing, mail order vendor constitutes a burden on
commerce.7 ' Congress certainly does not enact legislation in support of
a particular marketing device in order to destroy that which it apparently
intends to protect.
A scintilla of doubt may be raised by the fact that the McGuire Act,
its preamble, the committee reports, and the congressional debates all
are set in terms providing for state freedom of choice in resale price
maintenance policy. It cannot be ignored, however, that the McGuire Act
permits the making and enforcement of fair trade contracts in interstate
commerce, while the Act does not provide for the similar operation of
state anti-trust laws. The McGuire Act shows at least some recognition
of the fact that, like interstate commerce, competitive areas do not respect
state boundaries. The Act falls short of reconciling the conflicting state
laws and the border-crossing competitive areas, but the implicit recognition
of the problem is certainly significant and supports the contention that
the McGuire Act is an affirmative declaration of a pro-fair trade federal
fornia v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949) ; accord, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public
Service Com. of Indiana, 332 U.S. 507 (1947).
73. Perhaps the most extreme demonstration of how far the commerce power of
the federal government may reach is found in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
See also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). A discussion and collection of
cases showing in particular areas how far the commerce power has extended is found
in CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION,
S. Doc. No. 170, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 144-60, (Corwin 1953). The reason that only
minor aspects of our economy now remain free from the regulatory power of Congress
is not legal but economic. Stern, The Problems of Yesteryear-Commnerce and Due
Process, 4 VAND. L. REV. 446, 468 (1951).
74. See S. Doc. No. 170, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 144-48 (Corwin 1953) for a discus-
sion of the commerce clause in relation to anti-trust legislation.
75. An interesting presentation of the potential burden on commerce viewpoint is
found in 43 GEO. L.J. 258, 272-73 (1955).
NOTES
policy."6
Any doubts, then, that constitutional full faith and credit must be
given a foreign fair trade statute in a cause of action brought under that
law in the courts of a free trade forum are actually not significant since
the McGuire Act, due to its interstate commerce setting, has already done
that which is needed to require limitation on the activities of the mail
order vendors selling from free trade to fair trade states.
AMORTIZATION AND PERFORMANCE STANDARDS IN
ZONING REGULATIONS: STUDY OF EXISTING NON-
CONFORMING USES IN AN INDIANA COMMUNITY
Legislative and judicial protection of existing land uses which do not
conform to prescribed zoning restrictions have been a fundamental impedi-
ment to urban and rural planning.' Early legislation reflects a failure
to consider the neighborhood grocery or auto repair shop in a residential
district a significant problem for zoning regulation.2 It was assumed
that nonconforming uses would live their natural lives and then dis-
appear.3 The eagerness of planning commissions to have zoning controls
popularly accepted made them apprehensive of creating public4 and
76. That the McGuire Act represents a federal policy favoring fair trade does not,
however, require a conclusion that therefore the Cole proposal as a creation of a federal
cause of action, would have been preferable to the present Section 3 of the Act. Enforce-
ment of the policy of the Act need not precipitate an increased burden on the federal
courts; review of the state courts by the Supreme Court should adequately provide the
guidance necessary to prevent judicial abandonment of the Congressional policy.
1. Writers regard nonconforming structures and uses as the primary problem of
zoning regulation. Oppermann, Non-Conforming Uses & the City Plan, 15 3. LAND &
P.U. EcoN. 94 (1939); O'Reilly, The Non-Conforming Use & Due Process of Law, 23
GEo. LJ. 218 (1934); Notes, 1 BUFF. L. REv. 286 (1952) ; 1951 Wis. L. REv. 685.
2. Since zoning legislation was aimed at the regulation of prospective development,
existing land uses were not considered a barrier to present control. Therefore, planning
commissions were urged not to be deterred by the existence of nonconforming structures
and uses in the zoning districts. 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW & PRACTicE § 50 (2d ed. 1953).
3. The classic statement on this point follows: "Within a period of another
twenty years, a large number of such 'non-conforming' uses will have disappdared,
either through the necessity of enlargement and expansion which invariably is forbidden
or limited by ordinance, or by the owners realizing that it is unwise and uneconomic
to be located in a district which probably is not suited for the non-conforming purpose,
or by obsolesence, destruction by fire, or by the elements or similar inability to be used;
so that many of these non-conforming uses will fade out." METZENBAUM, THE LAW
OF ZONING 288 (1930).
4. "During the preparatory work for the zoning of Greater New York fears were
constantly expressed by property owners that existing non-conforming buildings would
be ousted. The demand was general that this should not be done. . . . Consideration
for investments made in accordance with the earlier laws has been one of the strong
supports for zoning in that city." BASS=rr, ZONING 113 (1936).
